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An Italian hackneyed phrase states “tra il dire ed il fare c’è di 
mezzo il mare” (something like a sea separates human actions 
from human assertions). Probably such a phrase inspired the 
two Italian Authors of “Innovation in Financial Restructuring. 
Focus on signals, process and tools”. In fact, the book attempts 
to match together the “assertions” on the capital structure 
theory with the “actions” of the financial practices in 
restructuring processes. The actual implementation process is 
often at the bottom of the (un)successful ending of the 
restructuring effort. Indeed, it is the separating “sea”: although 
you are a good swimmer, it can be a bit wider it may appear 
from the coast. Why? 
The capital structure theory is a patchwork, evolving from 
seminal proposals by Modigliani and Miller (1958) toward the 
current bigger picture as depicted in Chapter 1 of the book. The 
most recent pieces of knowledge add some qualitative (patches) 
approaches to the core ones, which had a more quantitative 
focus, namely the impact of leverage over the cost of capital. 
Accordingly, we all got aware that the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) is determined through components (i.e., cost of 
debt and cost of equity) which embed some original risk premia. 
This makes the relationships among leverage and WACC 
a non-regular one; in fact, they are filtered (sometimes: boosted) 
by other components of the firm making more and more 
complex the actual cobweb, therefore its investigation. Agency 
costs are emblematic examples of the above. The agency 
relationship may either bias the value creation processes by 
suggesting a reduction of leverage; or they may push superior 
efficiency boosting the operating returns of the firm and 
sustaining above normal leverages as Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, 
and Jordan (2015) describe. Corporate governance is another 
cornerstone. The bootstrap effects it may ignite depend on the 
nature of the stakeholders using the corporate governance 
framework of that specific company as Mantovani and Moscato 
(2020) demonstrate. The patchwork makes difficult to deal with 
a sound process of financial restructuring, accordingly 
a definitive coding of the financial practices to adopt. This is 
why associations and independent bodies make a continuous 
effort to update the standards, thus producing a continuous-
time flow of updates, as explained in Chapter two of the book. 
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The Authors provide their best effort to give the most 
up-to-date picture of the state of the art and they are very 
honest to declare the potential obsolescence of their 
description. In fact, any passionate about economic history 
knows that rigidity in standards is the biggest pitfall behind 
their efficacy. This was the emblematic case of Bretton-Woods 
agreements, which teaches next-to-nothing to the Basel 
Agreement designers. Just like the case of upgrades for any 
operating system into our laptops, they are always released 
once a sad experience took place…for the users! Similarly, the 
Basel Agreements receive core updates only AFTER a financial 
disaster takes place with the previous release. Indeed, the 
Authors warn us about this possibility when giving a detailed 
description of the L.M.A. standards. At the best of my 
knowledge, two other critical elements contribute to the 
complexity of the puzzle. On one side, you should consider the 
impact of firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risks over leverage. On 
the other side, you should be aware that debt maturity matters. 
We know the story: systematic risk is at the bottom of the 
most scientifically accredited (and used in practice) financial 
models, e.g., the CAPM. Betas are therefore the very basement of 
the pricing of capital investment instruments, including debt. If 
you investigate carefully the most recent pieces of the 
theoretical patchwork on capital structure (e.g., bankruptcy 
costs, agency costs, personal taxation, intangibles contribution, 
pecking orders, etc.) they are chiefly based on firm-specific 
items. Therefore, the trade-off effect as greatly synthetized by 
Tutino and Ranciano is really a balancing puzzle among the 
systematic and the firm-specific riskiness over the leverage 
decisions. As an example: while the tax-shield of debt 
contributes to corporate value through systematic risk, the 
probability of default is a very firm-specific element of risk 
although it (negatively) contributes to such a value as well. 
Maybe missing the distinction between these two different 
clusters of risk into the coding of the best practices is at the 
very bottom of their accelerated obsolescence. My personal 
suggestion to the Authors is to contribute more on this topic in 
the forthcoming editions of the book. 
Debt maturity is another “dark side of the moon” of capital 
structure theory that was partly investigated during last decade 
by Rey, Tuccillo, and Roberto (2020); Rashid, Islam, and 
Nuryanah (2014); Wolfe (2008). In fact, the standard practice is 
based on the duration matching principle…and its pitfalls! Since 
mid-nineties, Leland and Toft (1996) proposed an interesting 
approach based on the “endogenous-bankruptcy”. According to 
this approach, the cashflow mismatches over time may ignite 
default given a common set of economic background. 
Supposing that the shareholders may have an anticipated 
controlling capability over the company (as compared to debt 
capital investors) because of their superior information set over 
the company, this may lead to unexpected behaviours. In fact, 
when the long-term persistency of the corporate performance 
declines, they could decide to interrupt the hedging of 
mismatched cash flows and ignite default. Such default is 
endogenous and sometimes it can be even a crime. To prevent 
endogenous bankruptcy, you may design the debt maturity to 
prevent mismatching. Similarly, debt maturity re-design can be 
a fantastic tool to produce more effective results of any 
financial restructuring process. A more detailed explanation of 
the above concept is summarized by Mantovani (2015). My 
personal suggestion to the Authors is to consider more the 
proposal of Leland and Toft (1996) into forthcoming editions 
for paragraphs 2.3 and 3.3 which already give a very innovative 
contribution to the standard practice. 
One of the most innovative parts of the book is focusing on 
the control of the post-restructuring phase. In fact, this is 
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a topic where experts in law are writing the more, while 
business economists tend to be absent. In my personal opinion, 
the spreading of short-termism from financial markets to 
managerial practices (The Economist, February 16th, 2017) is at 
the basis of the reduced contribution by business economists, 
although is a lemma, only, of a deeper problem in the 
knowledge in business economics: the lacking knowledge about 
the drivers of the persistency in corporate performance and the 
(consequent) low-awareness of its contribution to business 
economics. The Italian School on Business Economics has a long 
tradition of research on that topic, provided the relief given by 
its founder, Gino Zappa, who conceived the “ordine economico” 
concept (economic orderliness) at the root of his proposal of the 
business economics (“Economia Aziendale”). Maybe this helps to 
understand why the two Italian Authors of the book make a big 
effort to give some insights on this topic which are clearly 
a direct consequence of their applied research experience. I 
must honestly say that this is the most innovative and 
outstanding part of the book, with extensions also into 
Chapter 4 describing a case history as an application. The most 
recent revisions of the value-based approach based either on 
the sharing of value among stakeholders (Porter & Cramer, 
2011) restored the seminal work by Fruhan (1979) who initially 
suggested that the persistency of value creation process were 
determined even by ways value is distributed among the 
stakeholders. The case discussed in Chapter 4 of the book is 
a clear proof of the great contribution that this approach may 
give to financial restructuring. 
As a conclusion, my opinion is that Innovation in Financial 
Restructuring is a must be read book, meaningless the different 
theoretical perspectives you may have. In fact, the tentative to 
cross the see dividing theory and practice in this topic is the 
most distinguishing and innovative characteristic of the book. 
Such a characteristic makes the book useful both for 
academicians and practitioners, by opening a wide use for 
pedagogical purposes. The continuous evolution of the subject 
will oblige the Authors to propose new editions with updates in 
the forthcoming years. Indeed, this is normal for this kind of 
topics and that is why I try to give my suggestions on this path. 
 
